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T he main theme of Utility and Democracy is that it was the
emergence of sinister interest that eventually produced Bentham’s “transition” to
political radicalism. Instead of ascribing the problems which, in his youth, he had
identified in the law to a lack of knowledge or judgment on the part of legislators
and lawyers, he realized that they were the product of deliberate policy. When, for
instance, he had written An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
he had assumed that it was the desire of rulers to promote the happiness of the
communities over which they ruled. By the time that he began to draft material on
parliamentary reform in 1809, he had come to appreciate that it was the desire of
rulers to promote their own interest in whatever way they could, no matter how
detrimental to the happiness of the community in general. Having recognized the
true nature of the problem, he saw that the only effective solution lay in bringing
about an identification of the interest of rulers with that of subjects. This was the
task of constitutional law, a task which would be achieved by maximizing official
aptitude and minimizing government expense.
The increasingly politicized and radicalized nature of Bentham’s later work
should not obscure the fact that the fundamental principles of his thought remained
constant  throughout  his  career.  His  starting  point,  both  logically  and
chronologically, was his understanding of the distinction between the real and the
imaginary, and his division of nouns substantive into the names of real entities and
the  names  of  fictitious  entities.  If  any  proposition,  no  matter  how  abstract  it
appeared, was to make sense, it had ultimately to be related to its “real source”, that
is to some object or objects – to some “substance” – which existed in the physical
world.  In  this  respect  there  was  no  distinction  between  a  proposition  which4
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purported to be a factual one about the natural sciences, and a proposition which
purported to be an evaluative one about what was valuable or desirable. When
properly expounded, the latter proposition was just as much a factual one as the
former, and morality was just as much a science as physics or chemistry. The entity
represented by the phrase the principle of utility was fictitious, but to talk about the
principle of utility made sense because it could be expounded by reference to its
“real  source”  in  the  physical  world  –  namely  feelings  of  pain  and  pleasure
experienced by sentient creatures. All other pretended foundations for the science
of morality were either nonsensical because non-existent, or a camouflage for the
selfish  desires  of  the  persons  who  articulated  them.  It  was  the  mistake  of  the
partisan of natural law, and of other non-utilitarian moral standards, to claim that he
had knowledge of right and wrong without any reference to facts.
The principle of utility, as conceived by Bentham, involved a commitment to a
form of political equality. Bentham took it as axiomatic that one person’s happiness
was worth the same as an equal amount of happiness experienced by any other
person. This was not, in itself, decisive in terms of justifying an equal right to
participate in the political process – indeed, there were good reasons to the contrary,
for  instance  where  a  person  was  incapable  of  judging  for  himself  what  would
contribute to his own happiness. What it did justify was the right of everyone to
have equal consideration given to their interest. A further argument was needed to
justify democracy. Now, Bentham always accepted that the best form of government
– and by this he meant that which best promoted the happiness of the community,
and that in turn meant taking the interest of each individual in the community into
account – was that in which the rulers were dependent on subjects. Hence, when he
first turned his attention, albeit fleetingly, to constitutional design at the time of the
French Revolution, he rejected the theory of the division of power (a term he used
to include the theories both of the balance of powers and the separation of powers)
on  the  grounds  that  it  did  not,  except  accidentally,  secure  such  dependence.
Bentham’s proposed constitution for France, put forward in the autumn of 1789,
was characterized not by a division of power, but by the dependence of the National
Assembly, wielding supreme legislative power, on the people as electors. He rejected
the need, in these circumstances, to impose any limitation on the legislative power
of the National Assembly. This was, in essence, the structure of government which
he would later adopt in the constitutional code. It was when Bentham recognized
that the dependence of rulers on subjects, and thence the equal consideration of
interests, would not be achieved except under a democratic form of government
that the utilitarian justification for democracy was complete.
In the autumn of 1789, and in the wake of the Declaration of Rights which
committed the French state to political equality, Bentham did propose a democratic
franchise  for  France,  including  female  suffrage,  and  was  led  to  consider  wide-5
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ranging electoral reform for Britain. His enthusiasm for reform was short-lived. It
was not long afterwards that Bentham was opposing any measure of political reform
in Britain, and arguing against popular participation in politics – arguments which
he  continued  to  deploy  until  the  late  1790s  and  possibly  beyond.  The  crucial
turning-point in Bentham’s political thought was, as noted above, the emergence in
his  thought  of  sinister  interest.  Bentham  became  totally  disenchanted  with  the
successive ministries of Pitt and Addington following the effective rejection of his
panopticon prison scheme in 1803 (the scheme was half-heartedly revived in 1810,
but finally laid to rest in 1812). It seems plausible to suggest that his reflection on
the causes of the rejection of the scheme – notably the self-interest of landowning
aristocrats who did not want their estates blighted by a neighbouring prison – led
him to discover the existence of sinister interest. A particular interest which was in
opposition to the general interest was a sinister interest. From the perspective of his
psychological theory, this discovery led to a deepening of his understanding of the
motives of those who wielded power. Rather than possessing a desire to promote the
interests of the community in general, rulers in fact possessed a desire to promote
their own selfish or particular interests, whatever detriment this might cause to the
general interest. Hitherto, Bentham had assumed that he could work within the
existing political system in order to introduce the reforms he thought desirable.
Henceforward, he recognized that since such reform would undermine the interests
of rulers, they would bitterly oppose it, and stoutly defend all existing abuses.
Having given up hope of building the panopticon prison, Bentham had, in the
late spring of 1803, turned his attention to the reform of judicial procedure and
evidence. By the summer of 1804 he had worked out in detail the way in which
sinister interest operated in this context. He argued that the appalling state of the
English  system  of  judicial  procedure  was  not,  as  he  had  previously  tended  to
assume, the result of intellectual deficiency on the part of lawyers, but the product
of a steady and systematic policy on the part of the legal profession, and particularly
the judges. The lawyers wished to maximize their income, which they primarily
received in the form of fees, whatever the expense to suitors, and thence to the
community in general. The lawyers had formed a “law partnership” in order to
extract the maximum amount of profit possible from suitors. The law partnership,
and in particular the judges, had not only established the existing system of legal
procedure  in  order  to  benefit  themselves,  they  had  also  managed  to  convince
legislators and the community generally that the system was excellent in all respects.
By  their  use  of  technical  language,  they  had  prevented  non-lawyers  from
investigating the state of the law, and thereby thwarted any attempts to introduce
reform.  In  short,  the  existence  of  the  sinister  interest  of  the  law  partnership
explained how things had got into the disastrous state in which they then existed,
and why lawyers were adamantly opposed to reform.6
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Bentham’s attribution of a sinister interest to the law partnership first appeared
in print in Scotch Reform in 1807 (published in 1808), which drew on the more
general material on judicial procedure and evidence on which he had been working
since 1803. Bentham composed Scotch Reform in response to a proposal announced
by government for the reform of the law of civil procedure in Scotland, and in the
hope that he would be asked to codify for Scotland. In this work he was extremely
critical of the law partnership, arguing that no meaningful reform would result if
things were left to the lawyers. He did not, as yet, implicate Parliament in the
partnership. The politicians, like the people, had been deluded by the lawyers on
the question of the desirability and feasibility of law reform. He soon came to think
differently. By the first half of 1809, when he composed the text later published as
Elements of the Art of Packing, he had come to realize that sinister interest was a
feature  of  both  the  legal  and  political  establishments:  it  was  Parliament  which
permitted the continuation of the fees which judges had imposed for the benefit of
the law partnership. Bentham’s immediate concern in the work was with the danger
posed to the liberty of the press by prosecutions for libel, and by the appointment
in these cases of special juries, which were packed with men subservient to the will
of the judge. Both the legal and political establishments had an interest in destroying
the  liberty  of  the  press,  for  it  offered  the  greatest  threat  to  their  position.  By
exposing the abuses from which they profited, a free press would provide a check to
misrule. So all who benefited from abuse – and this included all members of the
legal  and  political  establishments  –  were  united  in  their  desire  to  destroy  the
freedom of the press, for in achieving that end, they safeguarded the abuses from
which they derived so much profit.
With  the  insight  that  every  aspect  of  the  state  was  permeated  by  sinister
interest, Bentham was in a position to launch a sustained and detailed attack on the
English establishment – an onslaught which he carried on unremittingly until his
death  in  1832.  It  is  clearly  inappropriate  to  argue  that  he  was  “converted”  or
underwent  a  “transition”  to  political  radicalism  in  1809.  The  elements  of  his
political radicalism were already in place when he began to write on parliamentary
reform in the middle of 1809, stimulated as he was into doing so by a speech
delivered by his step-brother, Charles Abbot, to the House of Commons on 1st June
1809.  It  would  not,  however,  be  misleading  to  say  that  Bentham  underwent  a
“transition» to political radicalism between 1803 and 1809, as he applied his notion
of sinister interest ever more generally to the English establishment. By June 1809,
when he began to write on parliamentary reform, he was already a political radical.
The  work  he  eventually  published  as  Plan  of  Parliamentary  Reform in  1817
contained a “Catechism” written in 1809-10, and a long “Introduction” written in
1816-17. His aim in both was to secure “democratic ascendancy” within the existing
institutions of the British polity. The House of Commons would be made genuinely7
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representative of the people, and it would be freed from any corruptive influence
exercised by the King and the House of Lords. This would be achieved in large part
by an extensive reform of the electoral system, which would be characterized by
universal  manhood  suffrage,  annual  elections,  equal  electoral  districts,  and  the
secret ballot. The key proposal was the secret ballot. The secret ballot would enable
each man to vote for the candidate whom he considered would best promote his
own interest, for the universal interest was no more than the aggregate of the
interests of the individuals who composed the community. The secret ballot would
exclude the baleful effects of the influence traditionally exercised over voters by the
wealthy and privileged within the local community. There would be no point, for
instance, in offering a bribe, if the briber had no way of knowing whether the person
he had bribed had voted as directed or not. Bentham never wavered from his
commitment to the secret ballot, despite pressure on occasion to do so for tactical
reasons. Without the secret ballot, the rest of the reforms would, in his view, have
been ineffective; on the other hand, the introduction of the secret ballot alone
would have paved the way to further reform.
Having recognized the existence of sinister interest in the legal and political
establishments,  Bentham  extended  his  investigation  to  the  ecclesiastical
establishment. He had always argued that theology should not have any influence
over morals and legislation, but had not hitherto attacked religious belief on the
grounds of its pernicious effects on human happiness. He now saw that religious
belief was used to further the sinister interest of the priesthood and those linked
with it. As far as constitutional law was concerned, his main recommendation was
that there should be no religious establishment. In Britain, the Anglican Church was
merely another instrument in the hands of rulers to oppress and extort resources
from  subjects.  The  clergy  extracted  large  sums  of  money  from  the  population
generally, in order to provide income for members of the ruling few, without having
to provide any service or labour in return. The state supported the Church with its
coercive force, while the Church manufactured delusive arguments in support of
the state. Indeed, the scale of abuse in the Church was not only greater than that in
the  political  and  legal  establishments,  but  acted  as  a  bulwark  against  reform
elsewhere. Bentham was particularly critical of the role of the Church in education,
both in schools and in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. In relation to the
poor, its policy was to exclude from the benefits of education those unwilling to
declare their belief in Anglican doctrine, and to pervert the morals and intellects of
those who were willing. Bentham never overcame his resentment at being forced to
subscribe to the Thirty-nine Articles while a student at Oxford, and it was this
experience which led him to insist that the provision of education should not be
linked to the profession of belief. As far as the Anglican Church in general was
concerned, Bentham recommended its “euthanasia”, whereby, as livings and other8
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offices became vacant, they would be abolished. The present possessors would
retain their incomes and thereby not suffer the pain of disappointment, while the
expense of the religious establishment to the state, and thus to the people generally,
would gradually diminish, and the additional income derived from the sale of its
assets would be used to reduce taxation. Those people who wished to receive
religious instruction could continue to do so at their own expense.
Bentham’s writings on parliamentary reform, while focusing on the reform of
the House of Commons in order to render it dependent on the people, assumed the
continuing existence of the King and the House of Lords. It was only in 1818 that
Bentham appears to have committed himself to republicanism, by which he meant
a representative democracy which did not include a monarchy or an aristocracy.
This  development  in  his  thought  was  linked,  perhaps,  to  his  experience  in
attempting to persuade a “constituted authority” to accept his services as a codifier.
As we have seen, he had first offered to draw up a code for Scotland in 1808, but his
campaign had begun in earnest in 1811 when he had offered to draw up civil and
penal codes for the United States of America. He had assumed that penal and civil
codes  of  the  sort  he  advocated  might  be  introduced  under  any  system  of
constitutional  law.  By  1818,  perhaps  because  of  the  rejection  of  his  offer  by
Alexander  I  of  Russia,  he  had  come  to  the  view  that  it  was  only  under  a
representative democracy that rulers would countenance the introduction of an all-
comprehensive and rationalized code of law. It was necessary first to introduce a
representative democracy in order to achieve utilitarian reform in other areas of law.
Political reform was henceforward Bentham’s central concern. When at last in April
1822  he  received  an  acceptance  of  his  offer  to  draw  up  penal,  civil,  and
constitutional codes from the Portuguese Cortes, it was to the constitutional code
that he immediately turned his attention, and which dominated the final decade of
his life.
For  Bentham  the  key  principle  of  constitutional  design  was  to  ensure  the
dependence of rulers on subjects, hence his rejection of the division of power,
whether in the form of the balance of powers or the separation of powers, on
account  if  its  unsuitability  in  this  respect.  Instead  he  proposed  chains  of
superordination and subordination, based on the capacity of the superior to appoint
and dismiss (in Bentham’s terminology to locate and dislocate) the inferior, and to
subject the inferior to punishment and other forms of vexation. The supreme power
or sovereignty in the state would be vested in the people, who would hold the
constitutive power. Immediately subordinate to the people would be the legislature,
elected by universal manhood suffrage, and subordinate to the legislature would be
the administrative and judicial powers. The system of representative democracy was
not  an  end  in  itself  –  the  end  was  the  greatest  happiness  –  but  it  was  an
indispensable  means  to  that  end,  in  that  it  was  only  under  such  a  system  ofgovernment  that  effective  measures  could  be  implemented  to  secure  the
appropriate aptitude of officials and minimize the expense of government. The
securities  for  official  aptitude  –  otherwise  termed  securities  against  misrule  –
included the exclusion of factitious dignities (or titles of honour), the economical
auction, subjection to punishment at the hands of the legal tribunals of the state,
and  the  need  to  pass  an  examination,  but  the  most  important  was  publicity.
Bentham went to great lengths to ensure that government would be open to public
scrutiny, and thence subject to the force of the moral or popular sanction operating
through the public opinion tribunal, which consisted of all those who commented
on political matters, and of whom newspaper editors were the most important
members. Bentham saw the freedom of the press as a vital bulwark against misrule,
and therefore his attempt to encourage the diffusion of literacy by linking a reading
and  writing  qualification  to  the  suffrage.  The  main  difficulty  which  had  to  be
overcome was the propensity of rulers to make the sinister sacrifice, that is to
sacrifice the interest of the community to their own particular and sinister interest.
All these measures would ensure that, instead of an opposition of interest between
ruler and subject, there would be an identification of interest: in other words, the
ruler would be placed in such a situation that the only way of promoting his own
interest  would  be  through  the  promotion  of  the  general  interest.  Bentham’s
commitment to democratic government had a further consequence for his thought.
The tension between the role of the legislator in promoting the happiness of the
community and his insistence that the individual was, in general, the best judge of
his own interest, was resolved by a representative democracy. With sovereignty
placed in the people, those who were the best judge of their interests were given the
power (through their deputies in the legislature) to pursue them effectively.
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